Local network externalities are present when the utility of buying from a …rm not only depends on the number of other customers (global network externalities), but also on their identity and / or characteristics. We explore the consequences of local network externalities within a framework where two …rms compete o¤ering di¤eren-tiated products. We …rst show that local network externalities, in contrast to global network externalities, don't necessarily sharpen competition. Then we show that the equilibrium allocation is ine¢ cient, in the sense that the allocation of consumers on …rms does not maximize social surplus. Finally we show that local network externalities create a di¤erence between the marginal and the average consumer, which gives rise to ine¢ ciently high usage prices and too high level of compatibility between the networks.
Introduction
Network externalities are present when a user's utility of consumption of a good depends on the set of other users that are consuming the good. In the economics literature on network externalities, Rohlfs (1974) , Katz and Shapiro (1985) , Arthur (1989) , Farrell and Saloner (1985, 1986) , and Katz and Shapiro (1992) , network externalities are primarily captured by the unidimensional variable size. In reality the composition of the network may also matter.
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Consumers may have preferences for the type (or identity) of the consumers in a network as well as their numbers. This is referred to as local network externalities. The examples of local network externalities are abound.
The identity of consumers is important in classical network industries, such as telecommunication, when service compatibility is imperfect. Some telecommunication …rms (particularly mobile phone operators) set di¤erent on-and o¤ net prices. As a result, consumers prefer subscribing to the same service as the people with whom they communicate. There are similar e¤ects in choice between platform providers. It is convenient to use the same system as colleagues and business partners. In addition, increasing returns to scale in providing applications imply that the availability of applications for a platform will depend on the preferences of its adopters and hence customers will tend to choose a platform where the preferences of the other customers match their own.
Other examples can be found in the …nancial service industry, i.e. credit card and other bank services. In choosing a credit card, the trading habits of the other customers matter because they in ‡uence vendor acceptance of cards. In banking, direct and indirect transaction costs may be lower if trading partners use the same bank. In addition, a bank's customer base is a source of information that can bene…t customers within the bank's area of specialization Fjeldstad and Sasson (2010) .
The examples don't stop with the classical network industries. For consumption goods or services that involve social interaction, consumers generally have preferences for the identity of other customers. Obvious examples are clubs and social networking sites. For schools and universities, other customers (students) form a pool both for social interaction and a basis for a future professional network. There may be similar e¤ects in employment decisions if the attractiveness of an employer is a function of the set of current employees.
In the present paper we analyze competition in the presence of local network externalities.
Two …rms supply horizontally di¤erentiated products. As in the standard model, agents have preferences over product varieties, referred to as their technological preference. In addition they have preferences over the size and composition of the customer base of the …rms. This is modeled by attributing to each consumer a "social location" on a circle, and letting consumers have a preference for using the same service as consumers to whom they are closely located on the circle. Finally, social location and technological preferences are assumed to be (imperfectly) correlated. In the case of services that facilitate customer exchange, correlated preferences may relate to mode of exchange. With respect to platforms, users that are socially close may have similar technological needs.
Our paper makes four contributions to the literature on network externalities. The …rst is methodological. We propose a model of competition with local network externalities, and show that if the social preferences are not too strong relative to the technological preferences, then the model has a unique equilibrium. We characterize this equilibrium and show how it depends on the fundamental parameters of the model, the nature of the network externalities, and the relative strength of the technological versus social preferences.
Our second contribution regards the e¤ects of network externalities on competition intensity. It is a celebrated result that network externalities may sti¤en competition between …rms (Gilbert 1992 , Farrell and Saloner 1992 , Foros and Hansen 2001 , La¤ont et al. 1998 , Shy 2001 , as network externalities increase the elasticity of the demand function. Surprisingly, we …nd that with local network externalities this e¤ect may be weakened or even eliminated, even if the marginal consumers highly value an increase in the network size. The reason is that after a price change, the previously marginal consumer is inframarginal and the new marginal consumer has di¤erent social preferences.
Third, we analyze the welfare e¤ects of the model and show that the equilibrium is not socially optimal. Compared with the planner's solution, consumers put too much emphasis on their technological preferences and too little emphasis on their social preferences.
Finally, we show that local network externalities create systematic di¤erences between the average and the marginal consumers. In expected terms, the inframarginal consumer has shorter social distance to the average consumer in the network than has the marginal consumer. We show that if …rms o¤er two-part tari¤s for connection and usage, then they will set usage price above marginal costs in order to extract rent from the inframarginal consumers. When investing in enhanced one-way compatibility, …rms will overinvest, because the marginal agent will have stronger social ties to the customers in the other network than has the average customer.
There is empirical evidence that local network externalities are important. Birke and Swann (2005) study individual consumers'choice of mobile operators in the U.K. They …nd that individual choices are heavily in ‡uenced by the choices of others in the same household. Tucker (2008) analyzes the introduction of a video-messaging technology in an investment bank. She …nds that adoption by either managers or workers in boundary spanner positions has a large impact on the adoption decisions of employees who wish to communicate with them. Adoption by ordinary workers has a negligible impact. Corrocher and Zirulia (2009) survey Italian students' choice of mobile operator and …nd that local network e¤ects (the choice made by friends and family members) play an important role, although the strength of the e¤ects is heterogeneous.
Some of the seminal contributors on network externalities were aware that network externalities need not be spillovers. Rolphs (1974) pointed out that there may be "communities of interest groups" where the members care mostly about the behavior of the other members in the group. Farrel and Klemperer (2007) note that "A more general formulation (of network externalities) would allow each user i to gain more from the presence of one other user j than of another k", and refers to this as local network externalities without pursuing it further. Swann (2002) assumes that di¤erent groups di¤er in di¤usion rates and communication patterns, and on this basis show that network e¤ects hardly will be linear in the size of the network. Banerji and Dutta (2009) analyze an adoption model where the agents form groups, and the members of each group communicate more with the other members of the group than with members of other groups. Firms compete in prices and o¤er identical products, and there is an equilibrium where the market is segmented. If one …rm reduces prices marginally below the other, it may not attract a group as the members are not able to coordinate their decisions. Hence the market is segmented. Sundararajan (2007) analyzes consumers'decision to adopt a network when network externalities are local and the agents have incomplete information about the structure and strength of adoption complementarities. Galeotti and Goyal (2009) study optimal strategies for in ‡uencing the behavior of a group of people who are socially connected, and how this depends on the dispersion of social connections. Finally, our paper is tangent to a literature on coordination and formation of, as well as exchange in networks, of people, see Kranton and Minehart (2001) and Bala and Goyal (2000) , and Ballester et al (2006) .
In contrast with the contributions cited above, we assume that although network externalities are local, the number of connections of each person is large (in…nite), so that the law of large number applies. Our assumptions better re ‡ect sociological accounts of networks showing that people and …rms maintain a combination of a limited number of strong, often clustered, ties with closely associated others and a much larger number of weak ties (Granovetter 2004 ).
In addition, we introduce su¢ ciently strong regularity conditions on the model so that we obtain a unique equilibrium, with a structure that is similar to the structure in models with spillovers network externalities. Hence our model may bridge a gap between the literature on adoption in small networks and the literature on competition with spillovers network externalities.
The outline of the paper is as follows: In the next section we formalize local network externalities, and set up the competitive framework. We de…ne equilibrium and show existence and uniqueness in section 3, and in section 4 we study how local and spillovers network externalities in ‡uence competition intensity. We then move on to analyzing the welfare properties of the model in section 5. In section 6 we study how consumer heterogeneities that endogenously arise with local network externalities may in ‡uence pricing decisions, while section 7 concludes. Proof are relegated to the appendix.
Modeling local network externalities
We analyze competition between two networks, supplied by …rm A and …rm B.
The innovation in this paper is our modeling of consumer preferences, which have two parts. First, the consumers'social preferences are represented by a Salop circle, with circumference equal to two.
1 Each consumer has a social location (or just location) on this circle.
Denote by z i 2 agent i's social location, where = [ 1; 1]. We refer to the location z = 0 as the north pole and jzj = 1 as the south pole. Finally, let d denote a distance measure on 1 The motivation behind letting agents be distributed on the circle is to avoid the asymmetry associated with consumers on the end of a line that only communicate in one direction.
, de…ned as
Thus d(z i ; z j ) is the shortest distance between the two agents along the circle.
Let us give some examples. If the application at hand relates to membership in clubs, social location re ‡ects status and foci. If it relates to the choice of platform, e.g. Apple or
Windows based computers, the social location will be in ‡uenced by occupation and education. If the application at hand relates to banking, social location may re ‡ect industry and business niche, while in mobile telephony it may be related to friends and family.
The second step regards the utility obtained by interaction with peers choosing the same supplier. The function g : [0; 1] ! R + shows agent i's preference for being in the same network as an agent at social distance d. We assume that g is strictly decreasing in d, re ‡ecting that agents gain more from "being together" with people that are socially close than socially distant.
Suppose a fraction H(z) of the agents of social location z belongs to network A (or, alternatively, the probability that a person located at z chooses the A-network). 2 We assume that the value of interaction is additive, in the following sense: Then the social utility of joining …rm A and B for a person of location z i , denoted by g A (z i ) and g B (z i ), respectively, can be written as
We refer to this as the network utility of an individual associated with joining …rm A and …rm B, respectively. For notational simplicity, the subscript is dropped in all integrals from now on. Finally, de…ne g as
Note that g denotes the maximum network utility a consumer can get, the same for all agents, obtained if all agents in the economy is with the same supplier.
We do not allow g to be negative. Hence there is no crowding-out e¤ects of membership.
This seems to be a reasonable assumption for platforms, banks, and telephony, but maybe less so for social clubs, where the average member "type" may matter. Note also that this additivity property gives rise to increasing return to scale on the demand side, and thus brings in an element of spillovers network externalities. pricing of messaging and voice in mobile phone services). More speci…cally, let y denote the location of a consumer on the technology line, with …rm A located at y = 0 and …rm B at y = 1. Consider a consumer who has social location at z i . We assume that this consumer's location in technology space is stochastic and drawn from a distribution given by
Here " is drawn from a uniform distribution on [0; 1], i.i.d. for all agents, and the parameter a satis…es 0 a 1 . If a = 0 then y and z are independent. If a = 1, then the two variables are perfectly correlated.
The expected technological preference (conditional on z) can be written as
Thus Eyj0 = (1 a)=2 and Eyj1 = (1 + a)=2, while Eyj1=2 = 1=2. Note the symmetry around 1=2. The cumulative distribution function of y conditional on z , F (yjz) can be written as
Or, more compactly,
The distribution is illustrated in the following …gure;
The support of the conditional distribution yjz is indicated by the shaded area.
Let F (y) = R 1 0 F (yjz)dz denote the unconditional distribution of y, and f (y) the associated density. The conditional density f (yjz) is 1=(1 a) if ajzj y ajzj + 1 a and zero otherwise, hence the unconditional density at y = 1=2 is
The uncontingent distribution of y is thus only uniform in the special cases with a = 0 or a = 1. As will be clear below, this is not important for our analysis.
The utility of an agent with characteristics (y i ; z i ) by joining network A at price p A , and network B at price p B , is given by
The parameter t re ‡ects the intensity of technological preferences, below referred to as the "transportation cost" per unit of technological distance, while denote the intrinsic value of being connected to a platform. In what follows we assume that is su¢ ciently big so that the entire market is covered. We require that t(1 a) > g (see below).
The timing of the model goes as follows:
1. The two …rms A and B simultaneously and independently choose prices p A and p B , respectively. The …rms are not able to price discriminate by setting di¤erent prices for agents with di¤erent locations at the circle.
2. The agents independently decide which …rm to go to, given the prices and given their expectations about the choice of the other agents in the economy. In equilibrium, expectations are rational.
As a benchmark case, we derive the equilibrium of the model with pure global network externalities, i.e., where g(d) is independent of d. More speci…cally, g( ) = g=2 8 , in 4 To see this, note that
which after some manipulation gives the equation.
which case
consumer that is indi¤erent between the two networks (independent of z). It follows that
Taking the derivative with respect to p A gives
Suppose the …rms have equal costs c.
dy m dp A = 0. For …rm B, the …rst order condition reads
dy m dp A = 0. In the symmetric equilibrium with
Thus, from (4) and (5),
We have thus reiterated the well-known result that global network externalities reduce equilibrium prices in a symmetric equilibrium. The point is that global network externalities make demand more price sensitive: A reduction in price brings in new agents. This makes the network even more attractive, and even more agents are attracted to the network, and it is the existence of transportation costs that keep demand from exploding.
5 From the …rst order condition for p A and symmetry it follows that
In this section we derive the equilibrium of the model with local network externalities, that is, when g( ) is a strictly decreasing function of at some intervals. We …rst solve the second stage of the game, which we refer to as the assignment game. Then we solve for the optimal prices given the equilibrium of the assignment game.
The assignment game
In this section we focus on the agents choice of network for given prices p A and p B . The cost to a …rm of handling a customer is c j ; j = A; B.
The attractiveness of a given network depends both on how many other agents that chose the network, and on their social location. Let H 0 (z) denote the fraction of the agents located at z 2 [ 1; 1] that are customers of …rm A. For any z i at which there is an indi¤erent agent, let y m (z i ) denote the technological preference of that agent. Note that y m depends on z i , since the social position of the agent in ‡uences the distribution of the agent's friends on the two networks. From (6) and (7) it follows that
Let H 1 (z) denote the fraction of agents at social localization z that prefers the A-network given H 0 , and write H 1 (z) = H 0 (z). In order to characterize we use that
Since (6) and (7) are continuous in y, it follows that y m (z i ) and thus H 1 (z i ) are continuous.
From (11) and the de…nitions of g A (z i ), g B (z i ) and g it follows that
Inserted into (13) this gives
For given prices p A and p B , an equilibrium distribution function H e (z) is a …xed-point sat-
isfying
Proposition 1 Suppose g < t(1 a). Then is a contraction mapping with modulus
Hence, for any given prices p A and p B , the …xed point H(z) = H(z) exists and is unique.
Thus, whenever g < t(1 a), the coordination game between the agents has a unique solution. In order to understand the result, note that the assumption on parameter values implies that the technology preferences are strong compared with the network e¤ect. Assume for the moment that H(z) < 1 for all z and suppose as an example that all types increase their threshold value y m (z) with units. This increases H with =(1 a) units. The increased utility of joining network H due to network externalities is thus g=(1 a). The increase in transportation cost for the marginal agent however is t, which is greater than g=(1 a) by assumption.
As a result, self-ful…lling prophesies is not an issue in this model: an increase in the number of agents going to one network increases the attractiveness of the network, but not su¢ ciently much to compensate for the increased transportation costs for the new agents.
Given proposition 1, we can easily show that H e (z) has the following properties:
The equilibrium function H e (z) has the following properties
1 H e (1 z), 0 z 1=2 (with the analogous property for z < 0).
ii) For all values of z where 0 < H e (z) < 1, H e (z) is strictly decreasing in z for z > 0 and strictly increasing in z for z < 0 (except in the special case where H e (z) = 0:5 everywhere, see below).
iii) H can be written as a function of p B p A and is increasing in p B p A for all z iv) With p A = p B , the following holds:
a) An increase in g or a decrease in t increases H e (z) for jzj < 1=2, and the decrease is strict if H e (z) < 1. The opposite holds for jzj > 1=2.
b) An increase in a (a reduction in 1 a) increases H e (z) for jzj < 1=2, and the increase is strict if H e (z) < 1. The opposite holds for jzj > 1=2:
It is possible to show that for the case with
and convex on the complementary interval (the proof is available upon request).
Equilibrium prices
In this section we derive the equilibrium prices p A and p B . Let N A and N B denote the total number of agents in network A and B, respectively. Then
The pro…t of …rm A and B can be written
with …rst order conditions
With identical costs, the unique solution to the two equations is given by
The second order condition for …rm A reads
The second order condition for …rm B is de…ned analogously. Due to symmetry, N A ( ) is odd, and thus has an in ‡ection point at zero. Hence N 00 A (0) = 0, and the second order conditions are satis…ed locally.
Characterizing equilibrium
In what follows we want to characterize the equilibrium in some detail. To simplify the exposition we assume that c A = c B = c in which case the equilibrium is symmetric. In general, it is hard to characterize equilibrium. However, for some sets of parameters the equilibrium take particularly simple forms. We refer to these as open and closed equilibria.
Open equilibrium
We say that the equilibrium is open if 0 < H e (z) < 1 for all z, in which case there are marginal agents for all locations z.
½ 1 Network B Network A z z H(z)
6 To show uniqueness, note that it follows from (15) and (16) that
, the left hand side exceeds one whereas the right hand side is strictly below one, a contradiction.
Consider an agent located at z = 0 with the largest technological preference for the Bnetwork relative to the A-network, obtained for " = 1 (see equation 2). This agent prefers the B-network if
As g A (0) > g B (0), a necessary condition for open equilibrium is that this person has a technological preference for the B-network, i.e. that 1 2a > 0 or a < 1=2
A su¢ cient condition is that
The left-hand side is an upper bound on the social gain of being in the A-network rather than the B network. The condition requires that the maximum technological preference for (global network externalities) the equilibrium is open whenever a < 1=2.
Inserted into (17) this immediately gives us our next proposition:
In an open equilibrium, prices are given by (with topscript O indicating open equilibrium)
If we compare (20) and (10) (since a < 1=2) we see that they are identical. The existence of network externalities increases competition and decreases prices. Furthermore, the shape of g does not in ‡uence network pricing, only g. Thus, in the open equilibrium, only the global properties of the network externalities, measured by g; in ‡uences prices. The network structure, de…ned by the shape of g,plays no role.
Closed equilibrium
If the equilibrium is open, all the agents in the economy in ‡uence each other through friends of friends e¤ects, in the following sense: Suppose H(z) shifts up on an interval around an arbitrary z i . This will make it more attractive to enter the A network for all the agents who have friends on this interval. This again makes it more attractive to join the A network for agents who have friends who have friends on the interval, and so on. In the end H(z)
increases for all z.
However, if H = 1 (0) on su¢ ciently large intervals around the north (south) pole, this chain may be broken. To be more speci…c, let z 1 denote the highest value of z such that Note that z 0 is exogenously determined by the shape of g. For the equilibrium to be closed, the agent located at
with the largest technological preference for the B-network relative to the A-network, must strictly prefer the A-network.
The left-hand side of the equation is positive, hence a su¢ cient the equilibrium to be closed is that 1 2a(1 z 0 2 ) < 0. The latter can be rewritten as az 0 =2 + (1 a) 1=2. Note that this condition can only be true if a > 1=2, and it is always satis…ed if a is su¢ ciently large. Furthermore, as g ! 0, a necessary condition for the equilibrium to be closed is that
When the equilibrium is closed, the equilibrium distribution H has some remarkable , and let p be su¢ ciently small so that z 1 > z 0 +j j 2
. Then the following holds
This is possible also for z i < since by assumption H(z) = 1 on [ ; ]. The analogous result holds for p < 0.
By inserting (21) into (17) it follows that (with topscript C indicating that the equilibrium is closed):
Proposition 3 Suppose the equilibrium is closed. Then
If we compare (22) and prices without network e¤ects (9) with a 1=2, we see that prices are identical to a situations without network externalities (with g = 0). When the equilibrium is closed, network externalities do not in ‡uence prices! Hence in this regime, neither the size of the global network e¤ect g nor the underlying structure matters for pricing decisions.
To gain intuition for the proposition, …rst note that global network externalities tend to increase price competition, because they increase the price elasticity of demand. Reducing the price then increases the size of the network, and this will make the network even more attractive. This mechanism does not hold in the closed equilibrium. A reduction in price will increase the network size, and this increases the social value of the network for the agents that previously were marginal. However, these agents are now inframarginal. The now marginal customers do not have more friends in the network than the previous marginal customers.
To be more precise, note that from lemma (3), a decrease in say p A shifts the H(z)
function to the right with units. Hence the marginal customer at z + obtains exactly the same social utility as did the previously marginal consumer at z before the shift. Hence, the multiplier e¤ect associated with global network externalities is defused. This is possible as long as none of the agents communicate with people on the "opposite" side of the polar points (z = 0 or jzj = 1).
Hybrid equilibrium
A hybrid equilibrium is an equilibrium that is neither open nor closed. i.e., when H(z) = 1 for jzj close to the polar points while H(z 0 ) < 1. Hybrid equilibria may exist for a wide range of parameter values. A su¢ cient condition for the existence of hybrid competition is that a > 1=2 (which rules out an open equilibria) and z 0 1 (which rules out closed equilibria).
The pricing formulas (20) and (22) give a lower and upper bound on prices in equilibria with hybrid competition.
E¢ ciency
In this section we analyze the e¢ ciency properties of equilibrium, independently of which of the classes (open, closed or hybrid) it belongs to. First we derive the optimal distribution of agents over networks, and refer to this as composition e¢ ciency. Recall that g A (z i ) denotes the social value of an agent at z i of joining network A: At any given social location z i , a fraction H(z i ) of the agents join network A, hence the total social value created in network A, V A , is
Analogously, denote the total social value created in network B by V B . Then
In the appendix we characterize the allocations of agents on networks that give the highest and the lowest total social value, given that the two networks are equally large. The total social value is minimized if H(z) = 0:5 for all z, in which case each agent can communicate with exactly half of her friends. The social value is maximized if H(z) equals 1 on an interval with measure 1, and is zero on the complementary interval. However, the allocation that maximizes total social value implies that some of the agents are allocated to a network with a technology they disfavor. Hence there is a trade-o¤ between the social bene…ts of increasing the number of connections and costs associated with not allocating consumers according to technological preferences.
For a given distribution H(z) let T (z) denote aggregate transportation cost for agents located at z. Recall that the technological preference of the marginal consumer is given by (from 2)
(By de…nition this is also the technology preference for the marginal customer in …rm B). It follows that
Taking derivatives with respect to H(z i ) 2 (0; 1), and utilizing that f (yjz) = 1=(1 a) (from 3), gives
Finally, aggregate transportation costs are given by T = R T (z)dz A composition e¢ cient distribution, denoted by H (z) maximizes social welfare de…ned
We want to maximize W point-wise. In the appendix we show that with an interior solution, this …rst order condition can be written as
If the right-hand side exceeds 1, then H (z i ) = 1. If the right-hand side is below 0, then H (z i ) = 0. Thus H (z) is a …xed-point to the mapping g given by
If we compare (14) and (24) for p A = p B we see that the only di¤erence between and g is that t in is replaced with t=2 in g . Hence the following proposition is immediate Proposition 4 The equilibrium distribution is not composition e¢ cient. The social e¢ cient composition pro…le H ( ) is steeper than the equilibrium pro…le H( ). Thus, for jzj < 1=2 it follows that H (z) H(z) with strict inequality whenever H(z) < 1. The opposite is true for jzj > 1=2.
The result follows from Lemma 1 iv b) and the fact that the planner's solution is equivalent with the market solution with t replaced by t=2:
The e¢ ciency result is intuitive. The consumers, when choosing between suppliers, trade o¤ transportation cost and social gains. However, the social gain is matched by an equally large externality on the other agents in the network. The transportation cost, by contrast, is carried by the agent in its entirety. As a result, the planner puts twice as much weight on social value relative to transportation cost as the market, or equivalently half as much weight on transportation costs.
For jz i j < 1=2, H e (z i ) > 1=2. Thus, the agent located at z i obtains more social value by joining the A-network than the B-network. For the same reason, the positive externality of joining the A-network is larger than the positive externality associated with joining the B network, and it follows that H (z i ) > H e (z i ) on the entire northern hemisphere. The opposite holds on the southern hemisphere Put di¤erently, the net externalities associated with increasing H(z) at z = z i in the 
Endogenous agent heterogeneity
Di¤erences in preferences between marginal and average agents may give rise to distortions.
This was …rst explored in Spence's (1975) model of a monopolist's choice of quality. If marginal and average consumers value quality di¤erently, the quality level chosen by the monopolist will not be socially optimal.
Local network externalities, in contrast with global externalities, give rise to a di¤erence between the marginal and the average agents in a network, as the former in average obtains less utility from interacting than the latter. This is true both in the closed, open and hybrid equilibrium. In slightly extended versions of the model this may lead to new distortions, which come in addition to and may exacerbate the composition ine¢ ciencies analyzed above.
Communication intensity
In this subsection we assume that consumers, when connected to a network, choose how much to use it. This is clearly an important aspect in communication platforms, which we use as our example. However, it is also relevant for clubs (where agents choose how much to use it) and platforms like game consoles (where the agents choose how many applications to buy).
We assume that the utility a consumer obtains from communication within a relationship is endogenous and given by !(x), where x is usage. We let g A (z i ) and g A (z i ) denote the number of friends (or connections) in the A and the B network, respectively, for a person located at z i . For simplicity, we assume that only communication paid by the agent gives rise to utility. 7 Finally, an agent can only communicate with the agents in the same network.
Compatibility is discussed in the next section.
Firms compete by o¤ering two-part tari¤s (p j ; q j ), j = A; B, where q is the cost of using the network and p is a …xed fee. The net surplus v(q A ) per friend for a consumer in network
We write the optimal usage as a function of q A , x(q A ). Note that
The timing of the game is exactly as before, the only di¤erence is that …rms now advertise a pair (p j ; q j ). The utility for a agent (z j ; y j ) of joining the A network is
and similarly, the utility of joining the B network is
The expressions are identical with the corresponding expressions for u A and u B in (6) and (7) except for the multiplicative terms v(q A ) and v(q B ). By doing exactly the same exercise as above when deriving (14), it follows that for given prices, the equilibrium distribution
is the …xed point to the mapping x given by
Note that for given q A and q B , v(q A ) and v(q B ) are constants, hence we can show existence and uniqueness of the …xed point in exactly the same way as above.
as the total number of connections or friends in the network. 8 The pro…t of …rm A is given by
It follows that x(q A )G A shows aggregate usage of the network, while (q A c x ) is the mark-up per unit of usage. Note that the …rm not only care about the size of its network, but also its composition (the social location of its customers), as this in ‡uences G A .
We only consider symmetric equilibria. Since optimization with respect to p A corresponds to the simpler case above, we focus on the choice of usage price q A . In the appendix we derive the optimal q A , given the constraint that p A is adjusted in such a way that the market share of …rm 1 stays constant at 1=2. The …rst order condition for q A can be written as
where := g=2 G A and el q G is the elasticity operator. The variable shows number of friends that the marginal customers have in the network relative to the number of friends the average customer has in the network. To see this, …rst note that in the symmetric equilibrium, the agent located at z = 1=2 has half of its friends in both networks. Marginal customers north of equator have more, and south of equator less than half of their friends in the A network. Due to symmetry, it follows that in average the marginal consumers have exactly g=2 friends in the A-network. The denominator shows the total number of "friends" in the network. Since each network in the symmetric equilibrium obtains a measure of 1 customers (the measure of consumers in the economy is 2) this is also the average number of friends per customer in the network. With pure global network externalities = 1, in all other cases 2 (1=2; 1).
The …rst term in (29) thus represents rent extraction from the inframarginal types. Since inframarginal customers on average have higher communication intensity than the marginal customers, increasing the usage price increases total payments from existing customers, even though the …xed price p A is reduced so that the market share of the …rm stays constant.
The second term in (29) is self-explanatory. The last term shows the change in incomes from usage fees caused by changes in the composition of the network. In the appendix we show that el q G A < 0: A higher usage price hurts the marginal agents with many friends in the network (z low) more than those with a few friends in their network (z high). A higher q A thus implies that H becomes ‡atter, and hence that total tra¢ c falls (even though the market share stays constant).
However, with marginal cost pricing, q A = c x , the last term in (29) is zero. Hence with marginal cost pricing, the left-hand side of (29) is strictly positive as long as < 1. The next proposition is thus immediate
Proposition 5 The …rms set the communication price q k , k = A; B above marginal cost.
Thus, the communication price exceeds the price level that induces a static …rst best level of tra¢ c represented by marginal cost pricing (provided that < 1).
The …nding contrasts the standard result that two-part tari¤ induces marginal cost pricing on usage and therefore e¢ cient usage in the standard model without local network externalities (Farrel and Saloner 1992) . Local externalities create agent heterogeneity, and since marginal customers on average have lower usage than inframarginal customers tra¢ c price can be used as a rent extraction device. The …rm thus trades o¤ e¢ ciency and rent extraction for the inframarginal ("high-type") agents.
The network owner prices internal tra¢ c as if he had some degree of market power, where the degree of market power is captured by the relative deviation between the marginal and the average intensity of exchange. With global network externalities, symmetry between agents prevails (hence = 1), which means that the network adopts marginal cost pricing.
Note that decreases as the spread of g decreases, and approach 1=2 when the support of g converges to zero.
It can be shown that the result does not depend on our limitation of the contract space to two-part tari¤s. With an optimal general contract, increasing the usage price for marginal agents relaxes the incentive compatibility constraint of the inframarginal consumers, and hence enables the …rm to extract more rents from the latter. Finally, the e¤ect is weakened by the negative e¤ect that increased usage price has on the composition of the network. As long as the network has a positive margin on usage, the resulting reduction in tra¢ c is costly for the network.
De…ne the constrained e¢ cient usage price as the usage price that maximizes net welfare given that agents are distributed according to individual optimization (i.e., the price that emerges if a planner could set the usage price but make no other decisions). Then the following holds:
Lemma 4 The constrained e¢ cient usage price is below marginal cost
The lemma follows directly from proposition 4. There are no externalities related to communication intensity (since only the payer gets utility from communication). It is trivial to show that H (z), the socially optimal distribution function H (for given v) solves (27) with t=2 substituted in for t. Hence the socially optimal distribution H is steeper than the equilibrium distribution function H e .
As we have seen, a higher usage price hurts the marginal agents with many friends in the network (z low) more than those with a few friends in their network (z high):The H function thus decreases for values of z above 1=2 (with many friends) and decreases for z > 1=2 (with few friends in the network). It follows that by subsidizing usage, the planner can make the distribution function steeper and thus closer to the socially optimal distribution.
The market solution for usage pricing thus distorts the distribution of H e by making it ‡atter, and this leads to a distribution of agents on the networks that are even further away from the optimal distribution.
Compatibility
We will now discuss the …rms' incentives to undertake investments in order to make the networks compatible. We focus on the situation with one-way compatibility. Thus, network
A may give its members (improved) access to network B by undertaking an investment. Let A 1 denote the degree at which the agents in network A can utilize network B, and write the cost of compatibility as C( A ). We only include connection pricing (no two-part tari¤s).
The degree of compatibility is set independently and simultaneously by the two …rms at stage 1, together with prices p A and p B . In other respects the timing is unchanged.
We assume that compatibility from the A network to the B network only bene…ts the consumers in the A network (consistent with the assumption above that only the caller receives utility). The utilities of an agent (y i ; z i ) in network A and and B, respectively, are
given by
By reasoning exactly as when deriving (14), it follows that for given prices, the distribution H(z) is de…ned by the …xed point to the mapping C de…ned as
; 1 ; 0 Network A's net pro…t equals
In the appendix we show that the …rms will choose a degree of compatibility such that the marginal customers'valuation of compatibility equals marginal costs. Recall from the last section that the marginal customers on average have half of their friends in the other network. First order conditions for A is thus
The socially e¢ cient degree of compatibility (contingent on equal market shares), by contrast, maximizes welfare W de…ned by (23) less the costs C A ( A ) + C B ( B ), and where
Maximizing W w.r.t. A at H = H (the socially optimal distribution) gives the …rst order
The right-hand side of (31) is the total number of "friends" that the members of network A have in network B. Since the measure of agents in network B is 1 (due to symmetry) this is also the average number of friends members of network A has in network B. This is less than g=2 -the density of customers in network A is larger on the northern than the southern hemisphere, while the opposite is true in the B network.
Proposition 6
The …rms have too strong incentives to make the networks (one-way) compatible.
The result emerges despite the fact that there are no externalities associated with compatibility in itself, as compatibility is one-way. With local network externalities, the marginal agents value compatibility higher than the average agents, since the marginal agents communicate more with the agents in the other network than does the average agent. Since …rms compete for the marginal agents, it is his/her preferences that governs the choice of compatibility. Hence too much resources are spent on making the systems compatible compared with the socially optimal level.
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The comparison above is between the compatibility in the market solution and …rst best compatibility. If we instead use the constrained e¢ cient compatibility level as the benchmark, this will actually strengthen our results. First, note that if the planner takes the equilibrium distribution H e as given, equation (31) with H substituted out with H e de…nes the contingent optimal compatibility level. Since H e is ‡atter than H , the righthand side of equation (31) then decreases, and the constrained e¢ cient value of A becomes even lower (and thus further away from the equilibrium level).
Second, consider the constrained e¢ cient compatibility level when we take into account that the compatibility level in ‡uences the equilibrium distribution H e (z), in an analogous way to usage prices. Increasing A has a negative e¤ect on composition e¢ ciency, since it attracts agents that communicate intensively with the other network (that is types z i > 0:5) and punish agents with most of their friends in the A-network (types z i < 0:5). Hence, a high level of compatibility makes the equilibrium distribution H e (z) ‡atter. However, we have already seen that the e¢ cient distribution H (e) is steeper than the equilibrium distribution H e . Hence, in the constrained e¢ cient solution (where the planner could set the level of compatibility but nothing else), the planner would reduce compatibility further in order to obtain a more e¢ cient composition of consumers on networks.
Concluding remarks
Network externalities are important in a several markets, particularly related to ICT. In the economics literature, the focus has been on global network externalities, where the network e¤ects are related solely to size. In the present paper we argue that the network e¤ects not only work through the size of the customer base, but also through its composition, i.e., the attributes of the customers in the customer base and in particular their exogenously given relationships to each other. We refer to this as local network externalities.
We propose a way of modeling local network externalities, which is su¢ ciently rich to capture the main attributes of network composition and still su¢ ciently simple to make the analysis tractable, and which embodies global externalities as a special case. We do this by using a two-dimensional spatial model. Consumers have a location in a social space, and interact mostly with people located closely to them in this space. In addition, consumers' technological preferences are represented by a location in technological space. Finally, the consumers'location in the two spaces may be correlated in the sense that if two agents are close in the social space they are also likely to be close in the technological space.
Two …rms that are horizontally di¤erentiated in technology compete for customers. We show that as long as social preferences are not too strong relative to technological preferences, the model has a unique equilibrium. The equilibrium has several interesting properties.
First, the well known result that network externalities sti¤en competition may not hold when network externalities are local. Second, the allocation of consumers on networks is not e¢ cient, as there is a social externality associated with the choice of network that the customers do not take into account when choosing between networks. Third, local network externalities create a di¤erence between average and marginal consumers, and this lead to ine¢ ciently high usage prices and too high levels of (one-way) compatibility. (14) that
Hence, if neither the requirement that H 1 (the minimum operator) or the requirement that H 0 (the max operator) binds, it follows that
. If either the minimum operator or the maximum operator strictly binds, then
. It follows that is a contraction mapping with modulus Lemma 5 Assume that the distribution H 0 (z) satis…es H(z) = 1 H(1 z) for 0 z 1=2.
Suppose further that H 0 (z) H 0 (z) for all jzj < 1=2 with strict inequality for some z. Then
inequalities are reversed.
First note that it follows from (14) that if
Hence this symmetry property is preserved. Furthermore, since by assumption H 0 (z)
), it follows from (14) that 2 H 0 (z) > H 0 (z) for all z in the interval and vice versa on the complimentary interval. This holds for each step T . Since the mapping is bounded, it must converge, and since the equilibrium is unique it must converge to the equilibrium distribution. QED
Let H e 0 (z) denote the initial equilibrium, and consider an increase in g, a decrease in t or an increase in a. Then it follows from (14) that H 0 (z) > H 0 (z) for all jzj < 1=2 and vice versa for jzj > 1=2, hence lemma 5 applies. Property iv) thus follows.
Proof of lemma 2
Suppose dH e (z)=dp A is independent of z. In the open equilibrium, the de…nition of given by (14) reads
Di¤erentiating both sides of the …xed-point equation H e (z) = H e (z) with respect to dp A , assuming that dH e (z) = dH e independent of z thus gives that for any z i, H e (z i ) = gdH e (z i ) dp A =2 t(1 a)d or dH e (z i ) dp A = 1 2 1 t(1 a) g independent of z i . By construction, H e + dH is thus an equilibrium distribution, and as the equilibrium distribution is unique it is also the only one. As the social circle has a circumference of 2, dN A = 2dH, and this gives (19).
Di¤erentiating with respect to p yields N 0 (0) = 1 ta as stated.
Proofs regarding e¢ ciency
Maximizing and minimizing social value.
With two symmetric networks this is equivalent to maximizing V A with respect to the distribution H(z) subject to R H(z)dz = 1, that is The two solutions are referred to as the maximum and minimum solutions respectively.
First order conditions with interior solution
We maximize (23) point-wise with respect to H(z i ). When doing so, we have to take into account that an increase in H(z i ) in ‡uences g A (z j ) for all z j , and likewise for g B (z j ).
More speci…cally, a one unit increase in H on an interval z around z i increases social value for an agent at z j if joining the network by g(d(z i ; z j )) z units. The aggregate e¤ect is thus 11 Observe from the …rst order conditions that the number of friends in the A network, Z g(z i z)H(z)dz, must be equal for all z i at which H(z i ) is strictly between 0 and 1. Then it follows trivially that H can be interior on an interval only if H = 0:5 everywhere. (1 a) as stated in the text.
Two part tari¤ -…rst order conditions
In any equilibrium, the combination of p i and q i maximizes the pro…t of …rm i given its market share (Armstrong and Vickers 2001) . In a symmetric equilibrium, consider an increase in q A combined with a decrease in p A such that p A + v(q A )g=2 is constant. It is trivial to show that the new distribution function e H will satisfy e H(1=2) = 1=2 and e H(jzj) = 1 e H(1 z). Hence the market share of …rm A stays constant. A scale neutral change in p A ; q A thus requires dp
Maximizing (28) with respect to q A subject to (34) yields the …rst order condition
or (since N A = 1 in the symmetric equilibrium)
[1 ]x(q A ) + (q A c x )x 0 (q A ) + x(q A )(q A c x )el q G A q A = 0
where := Since g A is decreasing in z it follows that an increase in z makes H less steep, and as a result G A decreases. Hence el q G A < 0.
Compatibility -…rst order conditions
We reason in exactly the same way as when deriving …rst order conditions with two-part tari¤s. Firm A chooses a combination of compatibility and prices p A that maximizes pro…t for a given market share, i.e., solves (assuming symmetry)
with …rst order condition (assuming interior solution)
as stated in the text.
